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IN THE UTAH SUPREME COURT

RICHITA MARIE HACKFORD and
ROSANNA FAYE HACKFORD VALDEZ,
Plaintiffs/Appellants,

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS
CASE NO. 93-0400

vs.
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD,
Defendant/Appellee.

BRIEF OF APPELLANTS

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
This court has jurisdiction over this appeal pursuant to Utah
Code Section 78-2-2(3)(j).
STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND STANDARD OF REVIEW
1.

Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that the

transfer made by the plaintiffs was not based on a fraudulent
misrepresentation was erroneous.
Because this appeal involves only challenges to the trial
court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is one of
correctness.

GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 32

(Filed April 18f 1994) , and Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677,
680 (Utah App. 1989) , aff'd. 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990).
2.

Whether the trial court's conclusion of law that there

was valid consideration in the form of the Defendant bearing the
expense of litigation to preserve and protect the properties

and

the satisfaction of a lien against the property was erroneous.
Because this appeal involves only challenges to the trial
court's conclusions of law, the standard of review is one of
correctness.

GNS Partnership v. Fullmer, 237 Utah Adv. Rep. 32

(Filed April 18, 1994); and Marchant v. Park City, 771 P.2d 677,
680 (Utah App. 1989), aff'd. 788 P.2d 520 (Utah 1990).
DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY PROVISIONS
There are no controlling statutes in this action.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

NATURE OF THE CASE

This is a quiet title action concerning property in Uintah
County, Utah.

Appellants quit claimed their

interest

in the

property to their brother in 1985 and sought to set aside those
deeds by this action.
B.

COURSE OF THE PROCEEDINGS AND DISPOSITION BELOW

This is an appeal from the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of
Law entered on December 16, 1993 by the Eighth Judicial District
Court

for

Uintah

County,

Hon.

John

R.

Anderson

presiding,

dismissing plaintiff's amended complaint to quiet title in certain
property.

Notice of appeal was filed on July 6, 1993.
C. STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

The parties in this matter are siblings who jointly owned
property in Uintah County, Utah. Title to the property was derived
from a final decree of distribution in the Estate of Richard N.
Hackford, their father, entered November 9, 1982. (R. 136).

The

siblings commenced legal action against the parties' mother to
2

overturn

various

fraudulent

deeds

and

clear

defendant's name and the name of his sisters.

title

in

the

(R. at 137).

The plaintiffs initially deeded their interest in the property
to

the

defendant

in

1979

at

his

request

to

facilitate

the

litigation against their mother, and because the plaintiffs had
been advised and believed that if they owned property in Uintah
County, their

public

assistance benefits would

modified substantially.

be reduced

or

(R. at 138). The plaintiffs again deeded

their interest in the property to defendant in 1985, after the
first litigation was complete.

(R. at 138).

The trial court ruled that the second transfer in 1985 was
freely and voluntarily made.

(R. at 138). The court stated that

despite expressing some concern over the contents of the deeds in
1985, and with knowledge of their meaning, plaintiffs freely and
voluntarily signed the deeds in 1985 relinquishing their interest
in the property.

(R. at 138).

The trial court dismissed the plaintiff's amended complaint,
stating there was no fraudulent misrepresentation and that the
transfer of property was made for consideration, namely defendant's
bearing the expense of litigation to preserve the property in both
the probate action (Case No. 1452 and 2472) and the additional
quiet title lawsuit Hackford v. Potter. Case no. 11,179; and for
additional consideration of satisfaction of a lien against the
property

in

order

to

have

the

distribution. (R. at 139).

3

estate

free

and

clear

for

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court's conclusions of law are in error. The 1985
deeds were signed only because of fraudulent misrepresentations
made

to

plaintiffs

by

their

brother.

The

court

erroneously

concluded that the plaintiffs received consideration for their
interest

in the property in two forms.

First, because the

defendant bore the expense of litigation to preserve the property.
The expense of litigation was paid by royalties received by the
defendant from the property which belonged to all of the parties.
Secondly, the court held that additional valid consideration for
the

transfer

was

received

by

the

plaintiffs

through

the

satisfaction of a lien. This lien was a debt owed by defendant for
his own obligation.

The trial court failed to look to the intent

of the parties and applied an incorrect legal standard in both
instances in determining whether the plaintiffs' deeds should be
set aside.
ARGUMENT
POINT I.
THE TRIAL COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDED THAT THE
1985 TRANSFER OF THE DEEDS WAS NOT BASED ON A
FRAUDULENT MISREPRESENTATION MADE BY DEFENDANT.
The property

in this case has a convoluted

transfers and litigation.

history of

The property was initially awarded to

defendant, Richard Douglas Hackford, through a final decree in the
probate case involving the parties' father, Case No. 1452 and 2472
entered

on November

9, 1982.

(See trial court Exhibit 1).

Plaintiffs agreed to transfer title to defendant in order to

4

facilitate legal action against their mother and half brother, Jack
Potter,

who

had

fraudulently

acquired

title

to

the parties'

property; and because the plaintiffs believed that they would lose
their public assistance benefits if they owned the property.

(R.

at 137).
The court in the probate action subsequently entered another
order, (trial court Exhibit 12 [Dated June 30, 1982]), stating that
the plaintiffs had quit claimed their interest to defendant but
reserving

final

companion case.

decision

as to

title

to

the

outcome

of

the

The probate order numbered Exhibit 12 states at

paragraph 8 "This settlement, however, shall have no affect on the
litigation entitled Hackford vs. Potter. Civil No. 11179."
The

Hackford

v.

Potter

action was

initiated by all three parties here.

a quiet

title

action

That action resulted in the

entry of an order, trial court Exhibit 6, wherein title was vested
in plaintiffs and defendant.

That order was entered on July 27,

1983 and recorded with the Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985.
After the recording, defendant requested that plaintiffs again
sign quit claim deeds to him.

This was done on the 11th day of

April, 1985; and again on the 30th day of Pecember, 1985.
trial court Exhibits 7 and 8 ) .
deeds
deeds).

(There were two sets of quit claim

acquired from plaintiffs because of minor errors in the
It is these 1985 conveyances on which the instant action

is based.
deeds

(See

were

Plaintiffs filed this action alleging that the 1985
procured

by

the

defendant

misrepresentations.
5

through

fraudulent

In order for a party to show that a deed should be set aside
for fraudulent misrepresentation, the party must prove each of nine
elements set forth in Despain v. Despain, 855 P.2d 254, 256 (Utah
App.

1993): a representation was made regarding

a presently

existing material fact which was false, which representation either
knew to be false, or made recklessly, knowing that he/she had
insufficient knowledge upon which to base the representation, for
the purpose of inducing other party to act upon it, and that the
other party, acting reasonably and in ignorance of its falsity, did
in fact rely upon it and was thereby induced to act to her injury
and damage.

See also, Wright v. Westside Nursery. 187 P.2d 508

(Utah App. 1990).
The Despain court held that "[a] person may rely upon positive
assertions made by another, Dugan v. Jones, 615 P.2d 1239, 1247
(Utah 1980), and fraud in the inducement may allow the injured
party to avoid the contract.

Berkeley Bank for Cooperatives v.

Meibos, 607 P.2d 798, 801-04 (Utah 1980)." Despain v. Despain, 855
P.2d at 257. The Despain court further required that the reliance
be reasonable to be asserted as a claim of fraud.

Id.

Following the analysis set forth in Despain, plaintiffs deeded
their interest in their property solely upon the assertions made by
defendant, their brother, concerning their possible loss of the
property and/or their welfare assistance.

The defendant induced

plaintiffs to deed their property interest based upon material
facts that he either had insufficient knowledge to assert or
knowingly knew were not true.

(R. at 363 and 364).
6

Plaintiffs' reliance upon their brother's representation was
reasonable when considering his reasoning for the deed and their
familial relationship.

Defendant stated to plaintiffs that they

would lose their welfare assistance if the state found out that
plaintiffs owned property, and that defendant needed the property
title to advance the costs of litigation against their mother.
Relying upon their brother's assertions, plaintiffs voluntarily
deeded their property interest to defendant.
reasonable.

This reliance was

The record shows the plaintiffs had transferred their

interest to their brother on a temporary basis prior to the 1985
deeds.

(R. at 271 and 272).

property to defendant.

In 1979, the sisters transferred the

(R. at 137). Defendant followed through

with his promise to return the land.

(See trial court Exhibit 6,

signed and entered on the 27th day of July, 1983, recorded with the
Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985).
This Court held in a contracts fraud case that "a person will
be given relief from fraud even though he failed to read the
contract before signing if he was by some act or artifice induced
to refrain from reading it, or if because of the circumstances he
was justified in relying on the representations made

. . . ."

Johnson v. Allen, 108 Utah 148, 158 P.2d 134, 137 (1945).
stated,

plaintiffs

deeded

their

property

defendant's misleading representations.

interest

Simply

based

upon

They were justified in

relying on his statements because they had a relationship of trust.
The sisters had previously relied on his word, and he had followed
through with the promise of returning the property.
7

Plaintiffs

had

no

reason

to

question

the

defendant's

representations because plaintiffs presumed their brother would act
in their mutual best interest regarding their property.

The

plaintiffs trusted the defendant. Plaintiff Hackford Valdez lived
on the property and paid property taxes on the property, and
believed herself to be the owner. Accordingly, plaintiffs deeded
their interest solely for what they thought would be a temporary
situation to handle the litigation against their mother.
importantly,

neither

plaintiff

respective property interest.

intended

to

relinquish

More
their

The court failed to look at the

intent of the parties.
The

court

erroneously

concluded

that

no

fraudulent

misrepresentation occurred because there was valid consideration
received by the plaintiffs. This was an incorrect conclusion. The
court did not examine the nine elements required for the claim of
fraudulent misrepresentation. This resulted in the application of
an incorrect legal standard.

In arriving at this conclusion, the

court made several critical errors.
In the findings of

fact paragraph

number

6, the court

erroneously concludes that the prior litigation gave title to the
defendant at its conclusion. This was wrong as evidenced by trial
court Exhibit number 6.
this action.

Title was vested in all of the parties in

More incorrect findings were made in paragraph 6 of

the court's findings.

(R. at 137).

The court states that

plaintiffs had been advised and believed (right or wrong), that if
they

owned property

in Uintah County, the public assistance
8

benefits would be reduced or modified substantially as pertains to
the 1979 deed.

This was in essence correct, however, the court

erroneously concluded that what was at issue in this action was the
1979

transfer.

Although

the

1979

transfer

of

interest

was

important to show that the plaintiffs' reliance on the statements
of the defendant were
whether

justified and reasonable, the

or not valid consideration was received

transfer

is

not

determinative

in this case.

issue of

for the
The

1979

plaintiffs

transferred the property in 1979, based on the representation that
the property would be given back to them after the litigation.

The

record supports the fact that in this first instance, the defendant
kept

his

promise

transferred

to

return

the

property.

The

property

to them after the probate and Hackford v.

litigations were resolved on April 5, 1985.

was

Potter

(See trial court

Exhibit 6, signed and entered on the 27th day of July, 1983,
recorded with the Uintah County Recorder on April 5, 1985).
The Court while admitting that the initial conveyance in 1979
was made because the plaintiffs had been advised that they would
lose

their

benefits, makes

no

findings

as

to

the

claim

of

plaintiffs that the defendant told them that they would lose their
benefits and the property in the 1985 deeds.

The same type of

misrepresentation that was made to them in 1979 caused them to
transfer their interest again in 1985.

The record shows evidence

that a number of representations were made by the defendant, and/or
by defendant through attorneys, to the plaintiffs for the purpose
of inducing them to sign the quit claim deeds in favor of the
9

defendant in 1985.

(R. at 196, 225, 246, 274, 276).

The court

erroneously concluded that there was valid consideration for the
transfer in 1979, and uses that consideration as a basis to hold
that there were no fraudulent misrepresentations made by the
defendant.
Evidence was presented by plaintiffs and from two additional
witnesses, Arilissa Pope (R. 246) and Lillian Rene Brewster (R. at
259) supporting their contentions that they were induced to sign
the deeds only by defendant's representations and assurances that
the land would be deeded back to them at a later date.

The

plaintiffs testified that they questioned the signing of the deeds
and that they would have continued to refuse to sign the deeds if
they had not been assured that they were solely for the purpose of
assuring that they did not lose the land.

(R. at 272, 274, 275).

It is clear from the record that the court

erroneously

concluded that the 1979 deeds were being questioned.

This was

wrong in that the Plaintiffs had already reacquired their interest
in the land in 1985. Whether or not there was valid consideration
for the 1979 deeds was not a sufficient legal basis to rule that
there was no fraudulent misrepresentation as to the 1985 deeds. If
the plaintiffs did not have an interest in the property in 1985,
then there would have been no purpose or need for the defendant to
acquire another quit claim deed from both plaintiffs in 1985. The
court cannot use

"valid consideration" for the 1979 transfer as a

basis for holding that there was no fraudulent misrepresentation in
1985.

By concentrating on the 1979 deeds, the court failed to
10

apply the nine element test for fraud, and thus applied an
incorrect legal standard.

POINT II.
THE COURT ERRONEOUSLY CONCLUDES THAT VALID CONSIDERATION
WAS RECEIVED BY THE PLAINTIFFS IN THE FORM OF DEFENDANT'S
PAYMENT OF PREVIOUS LITIGATION AND OF A LIEN ON THE PROPERTY
The intent of the parties is relevant at this point.

The

trial court erroneously found that plaintiffs were given valid
consideration

for

allowing

defendant

to

bear

the

costs

of

litigation against their mother and for satisfaction of a lien
against the property.

Both of these findings are incorrect

assertions of law because valid consideration was not given to
plaintiffs.
The court failed to look at the crucial issue of what the
parties' intent was. Defendant had no intention of giving back the
title to plaintiffs' share of the property. The plaintiffs had no
intention
defendant.

of permanently

giving up their property

rights to

Therefore, the parties' intent regarding the transfer

of title is decisive in determining what formed the basis of
plaintiffs' and defendant's agreement to deed the property to
defendant.

There was no meeting of the minds in this case.

The trial court cursorily found that valid consideration was
given to plaintiffs, stopping its analysis there.

Had the trial

court more properly examined the consideration issue, it could
reasonably find that adequate consideration was not given in the
first instance.

The trial court's failure to critically analyze

11

the basis of the consideration allowed it to completely skirt the
more

relevant

inquiry:

the

parties'

intention

in

giving

and

receiving the deeds.
Because

of

the

temporary

nature

consideration was given by defendant
interests.

of

the

transfer,

no

for plaintiffs' property

The trial court found that the plaintiffs allowed the

defendant to bear the burden of expense of litigation to protect
and

preserve

consideration.

the

properties

and

thereforef

this

was

valid

(R. at 139). In its findings, the court held that

the defendant undertook to preserve the family estate by filing
legal action to overturn various fraudulent deeds and claims.

The

court further held that the defendant was responsible for all legal
fees and expenses in this action.

(R. at 137).

The court then

concluded that because the defendant bore all these expenses, that
was valid consideration for the 1985 deeds.
However, the
received
question.

evidence at trial

substantial

shows

that the

defendant

income from royalties on the property

(R. at 343-345).

In fact, the defendant

in

received

approximately $600.00 dollars per year since 1980 for the property
(R. at 346).

This would amount to nearly $7800.00 in funds from

the property

from

1980 to the time of trial in May of 1993.

Defendant then testified he received even more in monthly fees at
the beginning in 1980.

(R. at 344-345).

The court concluded that

defendant carried the expense of all of the litigation to resolve
the ownership of the property.

(R. at 139). This was erroneous in

that the royalties and income attributable to the property itself
12

would have amply covered any attorneys fees.

The Plaintiffs never

received any of the funds from the property, nor did they receive
any payment for the purchase of the property from the defendant.
(R. at 350).
The court further concludes that during the course of the
litigation from 1979 to 1985, the plaintiffs expressed little or no
interest in maintaining or helping the defendant with the financial
burden of litigating for the property.
erroneous

in

litigation.

that

plaintiffs

were

indeed

This was

involved

in

They were listed as plaintiffs in the Hackford v.

Potter litigation.
plaintiffs

the

(R. at 138).

(See trial court Exhibit #6).

acquiesced

in

allowing

litigation because he offered to.

their

brother

In fact the
to

head

the

They were in a relationship of

trustf and relied on him to protect their interest.

Defendant

himself testified that he felt the plaintiffs were incompetent to
handle the property and that he thought his sisters would lose the
property if they were given it.

(R. at 341-342)

He also testified

that he never paid anything to the Plaintiffs for the land.

(R. at

350), and that the plaintiffs could not afford to help him with the
attorney's fees.

(R. at 323).

The court concludes that the giving of the interest in the
land to the plaintiff's brother was in and itself consideration.
However, that would not inure to their benefit, since they would be
left with no interest in the property and would basically be giving
their interest away with no return.
The

court

also

erred

in
13

the

second

issue

regarding

consideration.

It concluded that further consideration was given

to Plaintiffs by satisfaction of a lien against the property in
order to have the estate make a free and clear distribution.
conclusion

is

erroneous.

The

$6000.00

dollar

lien

that

This
was

extinguished was not for the payment of any taxes or any debt due
on the property in question in this action.

It was instead for the

payment of a $6000.00 loan taken out by defendant to purchase other
property. (R. at 338). The lien against the property was incurred
solely by the defendant

for another mortgage to allow him to

purchase additional property for himself.

Therefore, it stretches

the imagination to see how plaintiffs could receive any benefit by
deeding their property interest to pay off defendant's personal
debts.

Obviously no valid consideration was given to plaintiffs

because the lien rested exclusively on defendant. Additionally, if
the estate was to make a distribution, and the plaintiffs had no
interest, than it could hardly be said to benefit them if every
other party in the probate case received a free and clear interest.
The record shows that Defendant promised the plaintiff Rosanna
Hackford Valdezf that he would return the property on several
occasions, if she would "pay taxes on it, get off welfare, she was
going to get a job, be self supporting, do all this and that".

(R.

at 335). He further stated that for the past eight years, Rosanna
had paid the taxes on the property and had improved the property by
putting up a garage.

(R. at 337).

The payment of the loan procured by defendant for his own
benefit can hardly be said to benefit the plaintiffs, because they

14

received

no

personal

gain

from

that

loan.

Therefore,

the

plaintiffs never received any consideration for the property.

In

fact the plaintiff Rosanna made significant

tax payments and

improvements on the property because she believed she was an owner
of the property. If the defendant truly believed that the property
was his, he would not be likely to keep promising to return the
property.

(R. at 335).

The court based it's decision on the erroneous conclusion that
the receipt of consideration eliminated the claim of fraudulent
misrepresentation.
plaintiffs.

There was no consideration received by the

They claimed that they were induced to give their

interest in the property to the defendant, through his fraudulent
misrepresentations. The court failed to look at the intent of the
parties and failed to apply the legal standard applicable in a
fraud action, resulting in the application of an incorrect legal
standard.
CONCLUSION
The trial court's failure to apply the correct legal standard
in

the

fraud

action

and

the

erroneous

conclusion

that

the

plaintiffs received valid consideration for their interest requires
that the trial court's decision be reversed.
DATED this

day of June, 1994.

SILVIA PENA CHACON
Attorney for Appellants
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I hereby certify that I mailed two true and correct copies of
the foregoing to Alan Williams, Attorney for Respondent, 365 West
50 North, #W10, Vernal, Utah 84078, this (A jtn day of June, 1994.
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Alan M. Williams
(3478)
Attorney for Defendant
365 W. 50 N. ,' #WJ.O •
Vernal, Utah 84078
Telephone: 789-^713

JL

.. deputy

IN THE EIGHTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR UINTAH COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
RICHITA MARIE HACKFORD and
ROSANNA FAYB HACKFORD VALDEZ,

FINDINGS OF FACT
AND
CONCLUSIONS, OF LAW

Plaintiffs,
VS

RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD,

Case No. 910800168QT

f

Defendant.
.This (matter came before the Court for trial on the 28th day
of May, 1993.
attorney,

The plaintiffs were present and represented by their

Randy

represented

by

S.
his

Kester.

The

attorney,

Alan

defendant
M.

was

Williams.

testified. Other witnesses testified as we'll.

present
The

and

parties

The Court received
i

argument.

The

Court,

having

reviewed

the

testimony

and

the

t

argument as well as the law, now makes the following:
FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

This matter concerns parcels of property located in Uintah

County,* State of Utah, described as follows:
Surface Rights Only:
Surface
right
to the fqllowing
escribed
property: Towriship One South, Range One East,
Uintah Special Meridian, Section 1,4: North
Half Southwest quarter containing 80 acres,
more* or less .
Grantee, however, shall quitclaim to Kenneth
Ray Hackford the following described surface
right:
Township One South, Range One East,
Uintah Special Meridian, Section 14:
North

Half South Half of the Northeast Quairtjer of
the Southwest Quarter of -said Section 14.
Together w.ith 10 shares of water and water
riijhts to said property, and together with a
right-of-way to hav^ access to the land.
.»

»

Grantee shall, quitclaim to Jonathan Dewey
Hackfordt the following described property:
Township One South, Range One East, Uintah
Special Meridian, Section* 14: The South Half
of the South Half of the Northeast Quarter of
the Southwest Quarter of said Section *14,
together with 10 shares of water in the Uintah
Ouray Irrigation Water system, and together
with* a right-of-way to have access to the land
and also share one-half of the expense of
fencing 'the above described property, if
necessary.
Mineral Rights:
An' undivided 46/80ths to the oil, gas and
mineral rights contained in t(he following
Township One South, Rane
tdescribed property:
One East, uintah Special Meridian, Section 14:
North Half Southwest Quarter, containing 80
acres, more or less.
Thfe estate will quitclaim to Rich'ard D.
Hackford the following described property
together wit,h the mineral rights thereto if
any:
Township One South, Range One> East, Uintah
Special Meridian, Section 15:
North Half;
Northeast Quarter Southeast Quarter.
South Half of the South Half of the SoutheastQuarter of the Northeast Quarter, Section 15,
Township 1 South, Range 1 East,- Uihtah Special
Meridian; ten acres.
Defendant currently has title to \.*he above-described property.
3.

The

parties

in

this

matter

are

siblings,

all

being

children of Richard N. Hackford.
3.

Title to theiproperty

derives

from a final

decree of

distribution in the Estate of Richard N. Hackf6rd, Probate No. 2472
under a decree of distribution signed and entered November 9, 1982.
4.

Richard N.Hackford, the predecessor in interest to this

land died irt,1977.

The defendant, Richard Douglas Hackford, was

then serving on active duty with the United Statep Navy.
return

in

attempting

late

19T7,

to 'spirit

it

became

apparent

that

his

Upon his

mother

off some of the acreage by selling

was

it to

i

various half brothers of the parties.
preserve

the family

estate by

The defendant undertook to

filing

legal

action

to

overturn

various fraudulent deeds and claims to made by the estate relating
to the above-jiescribed property.

The defendant was responsible for
t

all legal *fees and other expenses in the attempts to overturn all
the transfers of apreage.
5.

From

thet outset,

the

plaintiffs

were

asked

to

sign

t

conveyances jand deeds to the benefit of the defendant to allow him
to pursue both the probate*and civil litigation against the Jack
Dotter, the half-brother who had received one conveyance of land.
6.

The 1979 deeds were freely given and freely signed by the
r

plaintiffs for two purposes:
(a) To all6w Richard Douglas Hackford to proceed to
i

preserve the estate and property at his cost, and
(b)

The plaintiffs had been advised' and believed
!

'

i

(right or wrong), that if they owned property
in Uintah County, the public assistance benefits
would be reduced or' modified substantially.
Both plaintiff at the time, in 1979, and throughout the course of
this litigation received welfare and/or food stamps.
7.

Parties continued from 1979 for the next several years in
i

litigation with Mr. Hackford carrying the expense of the litigation
to resolve thte ownership of the estate.

8.

The plaintiffs also freely and voluntarily signed deeds

in 1985 giving* the defendant

all rtheir

rights

in

the

subject

properties•
9.

The litigation in both the Dotter case and the probate

estate was resolved in favor of the parties thus giving title to
the defendant,at the conclusion of the prior litigation.
t

10.

In 1985, one plaintiff, Rosanna Faye Hackford Valdez,

occupied one of thef subject properties by permission and with the
consent of the defendant. Although she did not pay rent, she was
required and, did pay property taxes as well as maintaining the
property

until

the

present

date.

Durihg

the

course

of

the

litigation from 1979 to 1985, the plaintiffs expressed little or
j

no 'interest

in maintaining

or

helping

the

defendant

with

the

i

financial burden of litigating the family interest and preserving
the estate of the acreage. < The plaintiffs were more secure in
their

public

assistance

payments

than

in

actively

pursuing

ownership of real property with its requirement' of capital outlay
for its preservation*.
11. Despite expressing some concern over the contents of the
deeds in 1985, and with knowledge* of their meaning,

plaintiffs

freely and voluntarily signed deeds in 1985 relinquishing
interest in the subject properties.
content

of

decree,

the

the description
descriptions

of

of

The Court finds that from the

the teal

the

their

various

estate

in

the

Quit

Claim

probate

Deeds

and

Warranty Deed^, and from the evidence that the pleadings should be
conformed to be consistent so far as the acreage in Township 1
South, Range 1 East, U.S.M., Sections 14 and 15, are concerned.

Based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the
following:
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
r

!

1.

Allydeeds to the defendant' from the plaintiffs were not
f

based on any fraudulent misrepresentations, and, in fact, the
plaintiffs acquiesced in allowing the defendant to bear the burden
of expense of litigation to protect and preserve the properties and
i

f

therefore were given for valid consideration.
2.

There is evidence that further consideration was also
f

given to the defendant based on satisfaction of a lien against the
property

in order

to have tke estate make

a free and clear

distribution.
3.

That the complaiht of the plaintiffs should be dismissed

with prejudice.
4.

^hat title to 110 acres more or less of the real estate

previbusly described in this matter should be quieted in the name
ok Richard Douglas Hackford.
5. Defendant should be awarded costs.
DATED* this
day of_ P&*~

Jf

. 1993.

Jud^e

annrcwnTTM
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MAILING CERTIFICATE
I hereby certify that a true and correct copy of the proposed
Finding^ of, Fact and Conclusions of Law was mailed postage prepaid
to Randy

S. Kester,

Attorriey

Springville, Utah, 84663 on this

at

La,w, at
6

101

East

day of

200

South,

fJdWuvk *-

1993,

dh,,%i.Wi]Ic

t-d-n-

UTAH LEGAL SERVICES, INC.
BY:SILVIA PENA CHACON #5335
BRUCE'M. PLENK #2613
Attorneys for Appellants '
124 South 400 East, Suite 400
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Telephone: (801) 328-9613
IN VTHE EIGHTH JUDICIAL1 DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR UINTA COUNTY, VERNAL DEPARTMENT, STATE OF UTAH
RICHITA MARIE HACKFORD
and ROSANNA FAYE HACKFORD
VALDEZ,
Plaintiff,

NOTICE OF APPEAL
CASE NO:

910800168 QT

vs.
JUDGE: ANDERSON, John R.
RICHARD DOUGLAS HACKFORD,
Defendant.
Notice is heireby given that Richita Marie Hackford and Rosanna
F. Hackford Valdezf appeal to the Utah Supreme Court from the Order
rendered in this action in favor of the Defendant, Richard Douglas
Hackford, in the Eighth Judicial District 'Court for Uinta County,
Vernal Department by the Honorable Judge John R. Anderson, District
Court Judge, on Jilne 8, 1993.
DATED this

0^

day of July, 1993.
SILVIA PENA CHACON
Attorneys Appellants

(ytfuitofVL.By:

SILVIA7PENA CHACON

py:BRUCE M. PLENK
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CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I do hereby certify1 that <1 mailed a true and correct copy of
i

the foregoing NOTICE OF APPEAL to Alan M. Williams, Attorney for
Defendant, 365 West 50 North, #W10, Vernal, Utati 84078,'this 6th
day of June,. 1993f

postage

prepaid,

A
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JUDICIAL CODE

(6) There is created the office of associnte chief justice. Trfe term of office of the associate chief justice is
two years. The associate chief justice may serve in
that office no more than two successive terms. The
associate chief justice shall he'elected by a majority
vote of the members of the Supreme Court nnd shall
be allocated duties a« the chief justice determines. If
the chief justice is absent or otherwise unable to
serve, the associate chief justice shall serve as chief
justice. The chief justice may delegate ( responsibiIities
to the associate chief justice as consistent with law.
y>90
78-2-1.5,78-2-1.6. . R e p e a l e d .

1971, 1981

78-2a-2

the Supreme Court shall review those cases certified
to it by the Court of Appeals under Subsection (3)(b).
(6) The Supreme Court shall comply with the requirements of Title 63, Chapter 46b, in its review of
agency adjudicative proceedings.
1992
78-2-3.

Repealed.

,

'i9B6

t

78-2-4.

Supreme Court — Rulemaking, judges
pro t e m p o r e , a n d p r a c t i c e of law.
(1) The Supreme Court shall, adopt rules of procedure and evidence for use in the'courts of the state
and shall by rule manage the appellate process. The
Legislature may amend the rules of procedure and
evidence adopted by the Supremp Court upon a vote
of two-tjui'ds of all members of both houses of the
Legislature.
(2) Excepbas otherwise provided by the Utah Constitution-, the Supreme Court by rule may authorize
retired justices and judges and judges pro tempore to
perform any judicial duties. Judges pro tempore shall
be citizens of the United States, Utah residents, and
admitted to practice law in Utah.
f
(3) The Supreme Court shall by rule govern the
practice of law, including admission to practice law
and the conduct and discipline of persons admitted to
the practice of law.
1986

78-2-2. S u p r e m e Court jurisdiction.
(1} The Supreme Court has original jurisdiction t?o
answer questions of stat'q'law certified by a court of
the United States.
f
(2) The Supreme Court has,onginal jurisdiction to
issue all extraordinary writs and authority to issue
all writs and process necessary to carry into effect its
orders, judgments, and decrees or in aid of its jurisdiction.
t(3) The Supreme Court has appellate jurisdiction,
including jurisdiction of interlocutory appeals, over:
(a) a judgment of the Court of Appeals;
(b) case.9 certified to the Supreme Court by the
78-2-5. R e p e a l e d .
1988
Court of Appeals*prior to final j u d g m e n t by the
Court of Appeals;
78-2-fc. Appellate court administrator.
(c) discipline, of lawyers;
The appellate court administrator shall appoint
(d) final orders of the Judicial Conduct Comclerks and support staff as hecossary for the operation
mission;
of the Supreme Coutt and the Court of Appeals. The
(e^) final orders and decrees in formal adjudicaduties of the clerks and support staff shall be estabtive proceedings originating with:
lished by the appellate court administrator, and
(i) the' Public Service Commission;
pdwers established by rule of the Supreme Court.
1986
(ii) the' State Tax Commission;
(iii) the Boar'd of State Lands, and Forf
78-2-7. R e p e a l e d .
1986
estry;
, (iv) the Board of Oil, Gas, and Mirfing; or
7R-2-7.5. S e r v i c e of sheriff to c o u r t .
t (v) the state engineer;
«
The court may at any time requite the attendance
(D final orders and decrees of the district court
and services of any sheriff in the state.
1988
review of informal adjudicative proceedings of
agencies under Subsection (e);
78-2-8 to 78-2-14. R e p e a l e d .
1986, 1988
(g) a final judgment or decree of any court of
record holding a s t a t u t e of the United States or
this state unconstitutional on its face under the
Constitution of the United States or the Utah
Constitution;
»
(h) interlocutory appeals from any court of
record involving a charge of a first degree or capit a l felony;
(i) appeals from the district court involving a
conviction of a first degree or capital felony; and
(j) orders, judgments, and decrees of any court
of record over which the Court of Appeals does ,
not have original appellate jurisdiction
(4) The Supreme Court may transfer to the Court
of Appeals any of t the matters over which the Supreme Court has original appellate jurisdiction, except:
(a) capital felony convictions or an appeal of
an interlocutory order of a court of record involving a charge of a capital* felony;
(b) election and voting contests;
(c) reapportionment of election districts;
(d) retention or removal of public officers; and
(e) those matters described in Subsections
(3)(a) through (d).
»
(5) The Supreme Court has snle discietion in
granting or denying a petition for fwnt of certiorari
for the review of a Court of Appeal*; adjudication, hut
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